O Brasil participa, juntamente com outros dezenove países, do Grupo de Reflexão sobre o Fortalecimento do Conselho de Direitos Humanos (CDH) das Nações Unidas, iniciativa informal lançada pela França e pelo México. Em razão de imprecisões e equívocos contidos em matéria jornalística publicada no último dia 3, que divulgava suposta “carta” sigilosa a respeito da posição brasileira no CDH, cabe esclarecer que as reflexões apresentadas pela Delegação brasileira – em texto distribuído abertamente – não corroboram a tese de que o Brasil buscaria evitar censura a países que violam os direitos humanos. Ao contrário, as idéias propostas procuram justamente fortalecer o Conselho para que se torne mais eficaz e objetivo no tratamento multilateral da situação dos direitos humanos em todo o mundo, como se depreende da leitura do referido texto (original em inglês).

Human Rights Council
Notes on Country specific Mandates

Non-Paper

As the preliminary discussions about the upcoming review of the Human Rights Council (HRC) move forward, it is possible to anticipate that among the most challenging issues to be addressed will be the question of country specific mandates. The manner in which the UN system – the Council and the former Commission, and even the General Assembly – has dealt with country specific situations lies, in fact, at the center of the challenges regarding the functioning of the Council.

For different reasons and from different perspectives, the general sense that the very institute of country specific mandates has proven to be far from effective in changing the situation on the ground seems to be widespread. Not only there is a heavy concentration of mandates relating to countries in one specific region of the world, but it is also open to questioning whether several years, and several mandates later, we are able to show any clear history of success derived from a given mandate: some mandates date back to 1992.

The combination of perceived inefficiencies, disproportional geographical concentration and politicization of the discussions has a negative impact over the working culture of the Council in more than simply item 4 of its agenda.

In the aim of exploring possible alternatives to this situation, this paper searches to articulate some ideas that seem to offer the perspective of a more positive and negotiating-prone environment. More importantly, it explores the possibility of a revised mechanism that might function better as a means to achieving concrete improvements on the situations on the ground. One key word here is “revised.” Indeed, the intention is not to reinvent the wheel, but rather to draw inspiration from existing tools and current practices of other UN bodies when dealing with country specific situations from a cooperative and result-oriented perspective.

From this perspective, two main areas deserve particular attention in the outlining of possible alternatives to be explored. The first one is the development of technical assistance and capacity-building mechanisms; whereas the second consists in the improvement of existing monitoring activity.

Among the clear lessons of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) seems to be the confirmation of a simple truth: every single country has challenges to be overcome in the area of human rights. Associated to that is the equally clearly perceived fact that the great majority of the countries show themselves ready and willing to cooperate with the UN system. Bearing this in mind, the Council could make use of mechanisms to help human rights improvements in those countries on the basis of the consent of the concerned country. There are several possibilities of doing so.

One of them would be the organization of informative briefings with the participation of the concerned country as well as with UN agencies and other relevant actors with presence on the field. The importance of such an initiative is, inter alia, in boosting the level, the impartiality and the volume of available information. Above all, it would also contribute for an informed and arguably less politicized decision by the Council on how to proceed.

In the same vein, it may prove itself useful to promote country visits by Member State delegations. This is already a current practice within other UN bodies, such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Peace-building Commission (PBC). The ECOSOC, for example, has recently sent a government delegation to Haiti to assess the situation after the earthquake. As for the PBC, Brazil is the country coordinator for Guine Bissau and, in this quality, has been involved in the organization of numerous visits to that country. Such missions – which should include members from all regions - would require a clear and focused mandate, to be negotiated and approved by the Council and the concerned country.
 

A second possibility would be the development of strategies for the implementation of existing UPR and other recommendations, in line with the practice of the PBC. Country strategies could include different actors, such as interested countries, regional organizations, development banks and relevant UN mechanisms. The main goal would be to establish a strategy on the basis of consultations with the Government within the HRC and with the participation of the concerned country and other stakeholders in order to implement recommendations from UN human rights mechanisms. The sense of national ownership of such an approach would go a long way towards guaranteeing a positive outcome. In this context one may envisage the notion of a joint appointment, by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the concerned country, of “facilitators of technical assistance” to implement strategies and plans under item 10.
The common element to both possibilities as outlined above is in the creation of more inclusive and transparent alternatives than those now provided by the usual resolution/country mandate package. Such new mechanisms could serve as an intermediate step between the universal review mechanism and country specific resolutions.
 

All these initiatives hinge on dialogue with the concerned countries. In the cases where no willingness to engage in dialogue is identified, other measures may prove to be necessary. It remains true, however, that once the Council has explored the tools and instruments offered to negotiation and diplomatic dialogue, the costs of non-engagement of the part of any given country become much higher. Today, once the Council moves directly to a contentious mode, via Country Specific Resolution or the calling of Special Session, it paradoxically serves well the interests of those who are closed to dialogue, as it provides them a sort of argument of selectivity and politicization in which to find refuge and to refrain from engagement.