Richard Nathan Haass, the current president of the influential Council on Foreign Relations in New York and a past Director of Policy Planning for the US Department of State, wrote a key book in 1997, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War, where he argued that Washington should forcefully maintain peace around the world. Haass saw the need for like-minded and friendly countries to accept the primus inter pares (first among equals) formula to save the unipolar system.

Decision-makers who outranked Haass advanced similar claims even if few resorted to the cowboy analogy that called for a posse to round up "outlaws". Speaking at Ohio State University on February 18, 1998, the then secretary of state Madeleine Albright declared: "We are the greatest country in the world, and what we are doing is serving the role of the indispensable nation to see what we can do to make the world safer for our children and grandchildren and for those people around the world who follow the rules".

The Sheriff's indispensability was on the line last week in Tehran when President of Brazil Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva joined Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to sign a historic deal with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Under the terms of their accord, 1.2 tons of enriched Iranian uranium will be sent to Ankara, which will deliver nuclear fuel rods in return to be used at a medical research institute, albeit a year later.

Needless to say, the Tehran announcement took western officials by surprise, oblivious to a rapidly changing world. Like stale British imperialists who were mystified by an anti-colonialist surge in India throughout the 1940s, western officials seemed bewildered that Brazil and Turkey would dare pursue an agreement with Iran without their consent, and which perfectly illustrated how empires lose momentum. Within hours, US President Barack Obama rounded up his own posse, as the Security Council agreed to impose sanctions against Iran. In Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's language, the "major powers" announced that they were not impressed by the da Silva-Erdogan diplomatic initiative, and would continue to push for sanctions.

Few cared to recall that what the joint diplomatic breakthrough allegedly achieved was nearly identical to a deal approved by the "major powers" in October 2009. Even fewer observers were surprised that Russia and China, no friends of the developing world, pressed for sanctions along with the US, Britain and France. Leading European countries, including Germany, Italy and Spain, were not impressed by the Brazilian-Turkish breach either. All seemed to agree that a deal reached in the developing world could not possibly present lasting value. Consequently, punitive measures were contemplated, which do not augur well for the Gulf region.

Today, and simply stated, Washington and its allies do not trust Iran. On the contrary, they accuse the Tehran regime of stalling for time through various manoeuvres, which is certainly a distinct possibility. Yet, and incomprehensibly, seasoned analysts were flabbergasted that Iran would not flinch from its path. It may be worth recalling that Tehran first embarked on a nuclear policy in the 1960s under the late Shah. Beyond shrewd Persian diplomacy, therefore, what motivated Iran ever since ought to be attributed to nationalist objectives. To be sure, ideological commitments were also valid reasons for Iran's contemporary initiatives, just as much as western, especially American, failures in the Middle East. In fact, the primary reason why Iran is popular among Sunni Arabs was due to its reluctance to "behave" like an obedient child when Uncle Sam and Cousin Israel wish to determine what happens in, and to, the Middle East.

Decades-old monopoly

Consequently, to say that times are changing may be an understatement, because the United States and Israel will gradually lose their decades-old monopoly to dictate terms in the Middle East.

Clinton and the "major powers" now face a dilemma: war against another weak developing country (since the days of major confrontations among the powerful are all in the past), or the acceptance of a new bread of diplomacy by upstarts like Brazil and Turkey. The latter may have prevented a possible new war, this one over Iran, although the last word on the matter has not been uttered and no one should underestimate the fury of the powerful.

What Haass' sheriff may do to prolong the unipolar security system does not bode well even if Albright's unfortunate "indispensable nation" epithet will haunt Washington for the next few years as the latter recalibrates its evolving global role. Long after Albright passes away as another inconsequential secretary whose visions were blurred by reality, the schadenfreude (pleasure derived from the misfortunes of others) of the first woman to occupy the post of secretary of state illustrates the intrinsic flaws of her "empire". Instead, in Tehran we see a sign of an emerging regional power that is no longer willing to play second fiddle, and while there is a way out of this existential dilemma, such salvation will require leaders of a different calibre who prefer to guide rather than dominate.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.